Many economies exhibit downward wage rigidity. Surveys of managers indicate that employers hold wages rigid because they believe morale will su↵er after a wage cut. Otherwise, there is little evidence for how employers' beliefs contribute to wage rigidity and whether those beliefs are accurate. Our design allows us to compare beliefs and e↵ort rigorously. We demonstrate that e↵ort falls after workers experience a wage cut and also that workers form reference points from wage contracts. Despite this partial confirmation of the morale theory as an explanation for wage rigidity, half of the employers in our experiment cut wages and lose money as a result. In a treatment where a recession is o↵set by nominal inflation, real wage cuts do not have a significant e↵ect on e↵ort. (JEL codes: C91 , D84)
Introduction
Why do we observe high unemployment during a recession instead of wage cuts? Nominal wage cuts were rare during the Great Recession in the US economy (e.g., Daly and Hobijn [2014] ) and are uncommon in most countries (Dickens et al. [2007] provide an international comparison).
1 There is extensive data on downwardly rigid wage contracts but very little evidence from the counterfactual: what happens if wages fall?
One cause of wage rigidity advanced by Akerlof et al. [1996] is that managers do not cut wages because they expect that wage cuts will lower worker morale and thereby reduce productivity. Bewley [1999] presented evidence supporting the morale theory from interviews with industry managers who said they believe that workers retaliate against wage cuts. The goal of this paper is to provide data at the individual level to test the morale theory of wage rigidity in an environment that eliminates the confounds of menu costs.
In a controlled experiment, we observe the wage level set by an employer and the e↵ort level chosen by workers in response to their wage. In the Recession treatment, the available surplus shrinks such that an employer may feel justified in cutting wages to share the impact of the adverse event. In an additional treatment, the recession is o↵set by nominal inflation, so that we can compare the reaction to real versus nominal wage cuts. The outcome of monetary policies often depends on how nominal and real wage cuts are 2. RELATED LITERATURE perceived by workers. Employers make incentivized predictions that we compare to the actual behavior of workers, which allows us to examine whether the beliefs of employers drive wage rigidity.
Our findings corroborate recent studies that show labor supply is a↵ected by reference points. Gächter and Thoni [2010] and Bracha et al. [2015] provide experimental evidence that workers reduce e↵ort if they learn that they are earning less than their peers. Workers in a field experiment by Kube et al. [2013] reduce the number of books they catalog for a library after their wage is cut relative to what was indicated in the job advertisement. In many of these studies, the wage is set by the experimenter. In our experiment, the wage is set by another participant and we provide no reference point aside from experience in past contracts with that counterpart. We find that workers react negatively to wage cuts. If employers reduce the wage, after a 3-round fixed-wage contract, the worker they are matched with often reciprocates with a reduction of e↵ort.
This paper presents a novel test of whether workers retaliate against wage cuts when the wage is endogenous and whether employers have correct beliefs about the e↵ect of wage cuts. We review relevant literature in the following section. We explain the experimental design in section 3. In Section 4, we present a theory of wage-setting that incorporates beliefs employers hold about worker reciprocity. Results are presented in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.
Related Literature
Several previous studies have addressed the question of how wage changes a↵ect individual e↵ort choices. The most relevant papers examine wage cuts specifically; and there is a disagreement in the literature as to whether wage cuts always lead to lower e↵ort. Previous experiments on wage cuts vary greatly in design. For example, in some cases wages are manipulated by another human subject and sometimes wages are changed exogenously by the experimenter.
There is consistent evidence that workers modulate their e↵ort based on how they perceive the intentions of their employers toward them. Charness [2004] tests whether workers react only to their monetary wages or whether the intentionality of the employer matters. He found that workers punish low wages that were intentionally set by employers. If an exogenous device (a bingo cage draw or the experimenter), selects a low wage, the workers did not cut their e↵ort so dramatically. The workers did not want to punish the employer for a wage that was out of their control. Charness found "considerable negative reciprocity" displayed toward an individual employer who is a peer and whose earnings depend on the e↵ort level.
Several studies demonstrate reference-dependent behavior among workers. DellaVigna et al. [2017] provide evidence from a natural experiment in Hungary that workers anchor their expectations around recent paychecks. Diriwächter and Shvartsman [2018] show that reported job satisfaction in Germany increases when workers receive a wage increase. This complements the experimental evidence from Sliwka and Werner [2017] that e↵ort is higher when workers receive wage increases. In a controlled experiment, Sliwka and Werner hold total compensation constant and demonstrate that increasing wage profiles are profitable for firms because it encourages high (unobservable) e↵ort from employees.
Exactly which circumstances make wage cuts painful is important to understand. Experiments are particularly useful in this pursuit. Chen and Horton [2016] find that workers in online labor markets naturally form reference points and quit tasks when they encounter wage cuts. However, workers are not upset if they provide a reasonable explanation for wage cuts. When an explanation is perceived as reasonable, the employer might not seem to be at fault or even in control.
Without providing an explanation, Kube et al. [2013] give workers 2 3 of the wage that they had expected from the wording in the advertisement for the experiment. The disappointment results in a 20% decline in e↵ort. DellaVigna et al. [2016] implement a pay cut of a similar proportion and do not find the e↵ect. DellaVigna et al. cycle workers through three di↵erent pay schemes in which workers do a real task for three di↵erent charities (all within the one-time experimental session). Perhaps the exposure to changes mentally prepared the workers to accept a wage cut during the final rounds. Wages are more flexible when workers expect changes or conditional bonuses. Wage flexibility was observed by Gerhards and Heinz (2017) in a paper closely related to ours. They implement a recession after one period of gift exchange through 3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN Figure 1 : Timeline of Parameters in each Treatment a 50% decrease in the workers marginal productivity. Workers in their experiment do not retaliate against wage cuts, which is also observed by Linardi and Camerer [2012] . Our findings are more in line with Kube et al. [2013] . We expose workers to the same wage for several consecutive rounds in order to establish an expectation that mirrors the experience of many full-time long-term employees.
To our knowledge, we are the first to measure the beliefs of employers and compare them to e↵ort. Employers' expectations drive wage setting. Our primary contribution is to investigate the e↵ects of loss aversion and beliefs on wage rigidity, which is a significant and novel step toward understanding why wages are usually downwardly inflexible during recessions.
Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to allow precise measurement of individual e↵ort.
2 That measure can be compared with the beliefs employers report about how workers will behave after a wage change. Subjects play a modified gift exchange game (following Fehr et al. [1993] ) for 7 rounds with the same partner.
Gift Exchange
At the beginning of each round, the employer sets a nominal wage, n 2 [3, R], where R is an exogenous constant. The real wage, w, is the nominal wage divided by the exchange rate, initially set at 130 ECUs/$ (Experimental Currency Units). The worker's payment for a round is w c(e). They pay the explicit cost, c(e), of the e↵ort level they choose, e 2 {0.05, 0.1, . . . , 1}.
3 The cost of e↵ort increases from one cent for the minimal e↵ort level to $0.80.
4 A table of e↵ort costs is in the instructions in Appendix C. In nominal terms, the employer earns (R n) ⇤ e. The wage is presented to both employers and workers in nominal terms and the exchange rate is explained in the instructions. After the worker responds with an e↵ort level choice, each round ends with a feedback stage where players learn their nominal profit and the employer learns the e↵ort level chosen by the worker. We use the terms employer and firm interchangeably in this paper. The subjects only saw 'employer' and 'employee' to denote their roles throughout the experiment.
The first round is a paid practice round. Next, there is a 3-round fixed-wage contract. Workers can set a new e↵ort level in each round but employers only select a wage in round 1, 2, and 5. Between rounds 4 and 5, subjects view information about experiment parameters which is di↵erent from the original parameters. Figure 1 shows a timeline of how parameters change in treatments Recession and Inflation. All treatments use identical instructions and are the same until the information stage after round 4. Figure 2 provides a screenshot of the announcement subjects see during the information stage of the Recession treatment.
In the Recession treatment, employers are confronted with a shrinking pie to share between themselves and the worker they are matched with. By the theory of inequality aversion, both the employer and the worker might decide that it is appropriate to share the impact of this adverse event. However, if workers anchor their expectations around their previous nominal wage contract, then workers may perceive a wage cut as unkind and reciprocate with an unkind reduction in e↵ort.
Worker morale is an important issue to firms because workers cannot be monitored perfectly. In our experiment, a worker who had been cooperating can drop their e↵ort level after round 4 without any fear of retribution. We allow for a fall in productivity to be possible because that is what managers ostensibly want to avoid by keeping wages rigid. Campbell and Kamlani [1997] found in a survey of 184 firms that managers believe a 10% wage cut would lead to more than a 10% reduction in e↵ort. We choose a recession size of 10% for our design to be comparable to this survey.
The parameters are such that, if an employer sets a wage in round 2 and keeps that wage "rigid" by setting the same wage in round 5, the employer would absorb all the loss in Recession. If the employer keeps wages nominally rigid in Inf lation, the worker would experience a real wage cut because the price level increases.
5 The cost of e↵ort is presented in real terms, so it does not change in Inflation.
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

Belief Elicitation
In round 5, employers set the final wage level and the employee choses an e↵ort level. Before the profits and e↵ort level is reviewed, subjects read a new page of instructions for the belief elicitation. Subjects learn the following history about a worker who is in their session but who is not in their pair: wage and e↵ort in round 4, and wage in round 5. This is the first time in the experiment that subjects learn anything about a subject outside their own employer/worker pair. After learning the history of another worker, subjects guess the e↵ort level that this worker chose in round 5. If they guess correctly, they earn an additional $2 at the end of the experiment. The purpose of this design is to better understand why firms choose wage o↵ers and we expect that beliefs play an important role in that decision.
Procedures and Subjects
Subjects were recruited from the student population of a large US state university through an email recruitment system. The experiment was conducted at visually isolated computer terminals using ztree software [Fischbacher, 2007] . The instructions are in Appendix C. During the instruction phase, subjects had several practice tasks that they did on the computer. All subjects entered a wage and e↵ort level and then calculated the profit for a hypothetical employer based on those choices. They had a calculator available for this stage. This familiarized them with the interface and the employer profit function.
After the experiment, subjects completed a short questionnaire. In response to the survey about race, 33% selected white. More than half of subjects reported having a part-time job and 54% of subjects were female.
For a loss aversion elicitation after the experiment, subjects made 6 yes-or-no choices. They could choose to participate in up to 6 lotteries that involve a risk of losing money (following Gächter et al. [2007] ). To determine which of the lotteries would be played, a volunteer rolled a 6-sided die. The volunteer flipped a coin to determine the outcome of the lottery.
There were 272 subjects in the experiment; 140 subjects participated in the Recession treatment and 132 in Inf lation, and no subject participated in more than one treatment. Subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee in addition to their lottery earnings (if any) and what they earned in the experiment (on average $16). Every round was paid. The experiment lasted about 75 minutes, including payment.
Model and Hypotheses
There is no monetary incentive for workers to reciprocate above-minimum e↵ort in exchange for high wages, especially in the endgame after the final wage has been set. However, we expect a positive correlation between wages and e↵ort; this reciprocal behavior has been replicated many times (e.g., Brandts and Charness [2004] ; Hannan et al. [2002] ). Therefore, we model a worker with the following utility function:
where ↵ 0 and > 0 are parameters that allow reciprocating high e↵ort for high wages. The real wage in time t is w t and c(e t ) is the real cost of e↵ort. The cost function has the usual form: c(0) = 0, c 0 > 0, c 00 > 0. The last term predicts that the second mover (worker) in the game helps the first mover (employer) if the worker feels that she has been treated well. Our concept of reciprocity follows Cox et al. [2007] . In our experiment, the cost function is specifically c(e) = 0.8e
1.5 which we will use for the example going forward. The loss aversion parameter, , is forced to zero at the initial stage t = 0 and also if the worker did not experience a wage cut. Using the nominal wage in the previous period, n t 1 , as a reference point, the loss aversion function is defined as
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
In the initial stage, without loss aversion and using our specific cost function, the workers best-response e↵ort function isê
. The elasticity of e↵ort in response to wage is 2 . The nominal wage, n, is the real wage divided by the price level. Since the employer usually has to choose a nominal wage, we will use n for the decision variable of the employer. The initial nominal wage is n 0 . Paired with this worker, an employer maximizes profit by setting the wage according to
The profit-maximizing wage depends positively on R. Thus, if R falls, which we will call a recession, n ⇤ also falls. Absent concerns about loss aversion, wages should fall in a recession.
If the interaction proceeds past the initial stage, then the choices in the initial stage could a↵ect the way a worker evaluates if she has been treated well.
6 If the subsequent wage, n 1 , is less than the initial wage, n 0 , then the worker might experience a sense of loss measured by .
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The e↵ort function accounting for loss aversion iŝ e(w t ) = (
If is larger than some threshold value , it is not profitable to cut wages in a recession, because e↵ort would fall and total profit would be lower than if the wage stays fixed. The value of is derived in Appendix B, along with the derivations of the optimal e↵ort and wage functions. The optimal wage for the employer to set, allowing for loss aversion is If R falls to 1035, as it does in the experiment, then the optimal wage falls to 296 marked by the dot in Figure 3 . The height of the dot indicates the highest profit the firm could make after a fall in R if the worker is not loss averse. The dashed line shows the profit to the firm if the wage is cut and the worker is loss averse, supposing = 1.1. E↵ort falls by so much after a wage cut that the profit-maximizing strategy for this firm after the recession is to keep nominal wages rigid.
Our experiment is designed to test the following main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Workers will reduce e↵ort if they experience a nominal wage cut. Specifically, they will give less e↵ort per wage received, thus, H A : > 0. Hypothesis 2: Anticipating hypothesis 1, employers will avoid nominal wage cuts.
We expect hypothesis 2 to hold in Recession, although alternative theories of fairness suggest that wages should fall after a recession.
Additionally, we can compare the e↵ect of real wage cuts when they are masked by inflation. Whether workers are more sensitive to nominal or real wage cuts is an empirical question left open by Dickens et al. 6 If we suppose, like Kőszegi and Rabin [2006] , that agents have a reference point based on (rational) expectations then this paper contributes to answering the question of how those expectations are formed. Do workers expect that their wages will stay the same, regardless of changing economic conditions?
7 The resulting best-response e↵ort function would be the same if is inserted as follows: U = w c(e) ⇤ (1 + ) + ↵ ⇤ w ⇤ e. In that presentation, experiencing a wage cut increases the "cost" of working. Hypothesis 3: When given the opportunity in the Inflation treatment, employers will avoid nominal wage cuts but allow real wages to fall.
Results
In the following section we present evidence that wage cuts cause workers to reduce e↵ort, which lowers the profits of firms. The subsequent sections contain the results of the incentivized belief elicitation and loss aversion elicitation. Beliefs and loss aversion both help to explain the choice of the employer to cut wages.
Main Results for Wages and E↵ort
It is evident in Figure 4 that positive reciprocity is operating in round 4, before the information stage di↵erentiates the treatments. The number of workers in each wage bin is indicated in the graph. Workers with higher wages work harder. It is essential for this experiment that at least some of the subjects be operating with "good morale" before the negative shock. The average e↵ort between treatments is similar in round 4 (a t-test indicates no di↵erence). Figure A1 shows average e↵ort in each round, by treatment.
It appears that many workers who received any wage higher than $2 felt that their wage was fair or adequate and they reciprocated with an e↵ort level near the middle of the feasible e↵ort range. That wage contract forms a reference point for workers. Four workers who received a wage above $6 are not pictured in Figure 4 8 . About half of the workers in Recession treatments experience a nominal wage cut. The second row of CDFs in Figure 5 show the change in the wage distribution between rounds 4 and 5. The average real wage went down slightly in Recession. Those wage cuts had a large e↵ect on the distribution of e↵ort choices in round 5, shown in the first row of CDFs. Although half of the workers in Inf lation receive real wage cuts, the distribution of e↵ort does not noticeably change. Figure 5 depicts the changes in the full sample between round 4 and 5. The vertical line on the left of the e↵ort graphs show that more than 20% of the workers pick an e↵ort level of 0.05 in round 4. The upward shift in the dashed line in the e↵ort graph for Recession shows that the cumulative distribution of e↵ort in Recession drops after half of the workers experience wage cuts. As we will show later, this is driven by the individuals who received wage cuts and who had previously been working above the minimum e↵ort level.
Result 1: If a worker experiences a wage cut, they respond by reducing e↵ort.
Because the e↵ort choice is censored below at 0.05, we use tobit analysis to measure the e↵ect of a wage cut on e↵ort between round 4 and 5. We include a dummy for whether a worker experienced a real wage cut, in each treatment. We also include a dummy for round 5 to pick up a possible endgame e↵ect that would cause e↵ort for all the workers to fall. We indicate if a worker was at the minimum e↵ort level in round 4 with M inimumEf f ort. A workers who is already at an e↵ort level of 0.05 in round 4 cannot reduce their e↵ort level any lower in response to a wage cut.
Column (3) of Table 1 shows tobit estimates for the following equation:
If cooperation collapsed in the endgame, then the coe cient on Round 5 would be negative. It is clear from Table 1 and also Figure A1 that many workers reciprocate a high e↵ort level if they feel they are being treated well, even though the employer has no means for punishment after round 4.
However, wage cuts lead to dramatic reductions in e↵ort. With all of the controls in column (3), receiving a real wage cut in Recession is associated with a drop in e↵ort by more than 0.15 which means more than 3 discrete intervals lower in the e↵ort choices on average. The unlucky event of a recession does not appear to inspire sympathy toward employers. The size of the coe cient on wage cuts gets smaller when we control for the wage level, but it remains large and significant. The result is robust to using data from rounds 2-7 and also for adding a dummy variable indicating that a worker received a wage cut after round 1.
Judging by the magnitude of the coe cients on the cut dummies, real wage cuts matter more in Recession than in Inf lation. The direction of the e↵ect is negative for Inflation, but variance is higher, likely due to nominal illusion. Figure 6 shows how workers who had somewhat good morale before the negative economic shock respond to nominal wage cuts. If a subject's real wage is between $2 and $4 in round 5, and if that subject did not experience a nominal wage cut, then they will give back an e↵ort level above 0.5 on average. Someone who experienced a wage in the same range but who got a nominal wage cut will work less. A nominal wage cut in Inf lation implies a large real wage cut, so we observe a slightly larger response in Inf lation. Here we exclude workers who were already at the minimum e↵ort level in round 4, but the result is similar in the full sample, shown in A4. More detail on how e↵ort changes in response to wage cuts in each treatment is documented in Appendix A.
This confirms the evidence we present in Table 1 . The wage in rounds 2-4 became a reference point and workers retaliated against wage cuts. Workers form a reference point after they are exposed to a fixed wage three times, from round 2 to round 4. In our experiment, even after a recession, workers do not expect that the contract will be renegotiated.
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Result 2a: Despite the decline in e↵ort in response to wage cuts, wage cuts are common. Table 2 shows that nearly half of employers cut real wages between round 4 and round 5. Nominal wage cuts occur nearly twice as often in Recession as in Inflation, which yields about the same number of real wage cuts in both treatments. The high frequency of nominal wage cuts in the experiment is surprising considering that wage cuts are rare in the economy. There are very few employers who hold nominal wages "rigid," even in Inf lation. It is possible that some employers intend the wage cut to be a costly punishment, however the average e↵ort level of workers who experienced a wage cut is not lower on average.
RESULTS
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Result 2b: Employers who cut nominal wages earn less in round 5.
The fact that so many employers choose to cut wages provides a unique opportunity to observe what happens to e↵ort when wages fall. Because e↵ort went down in response to wage cuts, the profits earned in round 5 by employers who cut nominal wages were lower than profits earned by employers who did not cut wages. In support of this hypothesis, we look at firms who were matched with a worker who was not shirking in Round 4 and we find that the profit of firms who implement nominal wage cuts is 29% lower than firms who did not ($2.21 vs. $3.09; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.01, n 1 = 48, n 2 = 47). See additional results broken down by treatment in Table A1 . A linear regression reported in Table A2 indicates that a nominal wage cut is associated with earning $0.70 less in round 5 for all firms, controlling for treatment.
Estimating Model Parameters for E↵ort and Beliefs
After the wage and e↵ort decisions are made in round 5 (and before employers learn the e↵ort choice of the worker they are paired with), participants are asked to predict the e↵ort choice of another participant who is in the room but with whom they have not interacted. They learn the wage and e↵ort response in round 4 and the wage o↵er in round 5 for that worker. If they can correctly guess the worker's e↵ort level in round 5, they earn a bonus payment, so there is an incentive to be accurate.
Result 3: Employers do not anticipate how much e↵ort falls after a nominal wage cut.
A nominal wage cut significantly reduces e↵ort, as shown in the previous section. When predicting the actions of a worker in their experiment session, employers do not appear to understand the e↵ect of wage cuts.
To compare the predicted and actual e↵ect of nominal wage cuts, we estimate the parameter values of the model introduced in Section 2. Recall that ↵ and measure positive reciprocity that leads to higher e↵ort in response to higher wages. If workers react negatively to nominal wage cuts producing a discontinuity of the positive reciprocity function, then they have a positive value of .
The estimates presented in the first column of Table 3 are for the e↵ort decisions in the actual data from rounds 4 and 5. The positive and significant coe cient on N om.Cut,Reces. indicates that workers work less hard after receiving a nominal wage cut, when they are not distracted by inflation.
We obtain the coe cients with a nonlinear least squares estimation of the following equation:
The average e↵ort level in round 4 of workers who experience a real wage cut (0.42) is higher than the average level of workers who do not experience a wage cut (0.30). 
RESULTS
where is a dummy indicator for observations in the Recession treatment that involve a nominal wage cut. Let be a dummy indicator for observations in the Inflation treatment that involve a nominal wage cut. The it subscript is added to these dummy indicators because they are person-specific and round-specific. Workers can only experience a wage cut in round 5. E↵ort in round 4 and 5 is the variable on the left-hand side. The real wage o↵er to the worker is w it , which was observable to the worker deciding the actual e↵ort and to the employer making the prediction. We estimate separate ↵ coe cients for round 4 and round 5 so that we are able to capture an endgame e↵ect.
To compare beliefs with actual e↵ort decisions, we merge the e↵ort choices from round 4 with the predictions made by employers. The estimate for the predicted N om.Cut,Reces. in the second column of Table 3 is very small. Employers do not seem to realize how much wages cuts will upset workers. The sample in Table 3 excludes 41 workers who chose e↵ort of 0.05 in round 4. Results for the full sample are reported in Table A3 .
Using the model described in Section 2 and the parameters used in the experiment, we can calculate a threshold level of above which wage rigidity is a more profitable strategy for firms during a recession (see Appendix B for derivation). The value 0.233 estimated for the actual e↵ort decisions without inflation is well above that threshold level. For most employers, keeping wages rigid would have been a more profitable strategy in this experiment.
Note that subjects enter the lab together and complete identical instructions before being informed of their randomly assigned role in the experiment. Although they have access to all of the same information that workers had, employers have a poor understanding of the reciprocity dynamics, as indicated not just by their wage choice but by their predictions of worker behavior. This information about the beliefs of employers helps eliminate the competing explanation that employers lowered wages out of spite knowing that they would lose money.
Di↵erent environments could put workers out of "system 1" (the unreflective reaction mode of action described by Kahneman [2011] ) and cause them to behave more like the employers predicted they would. For example, Gerhards and Heinz [2017] in a di↵erent experiment did not find that employees retaliated against wage cuts. Also, it is a question for future research whether and how employers would learn. Sliwka and Werner [2017] similarly found that experimental subjects in the role of employers made suboptimal choices, likely because they did not understand how to motivate workers. However, professional human resource managers were capable of predicting how workers would respond to di↵erent wage profiles in that experiment.
Loss Aversion
After our experiment, subjects answer several questions. We elicit loss aversion using a menu of 6 lottery choices. Every lottery o↵ers a 50% chance to win $7. The equally-probably loss is $3 in the first lottery and increases by $1 for each subsequent lottery (modifying Gächter et al. [2007] ). A highly loss averse subject might decline a chance to play any of these lotteries. Our measure of loss tolerance is the total number of lotteries chosen by the individual. After every subject submitted their choices, one subject volunteered to roll a die and flip a coin. The die determined the lottery that would be paid and the coin flip determined whether the subjects who agreed to play that lottery would win $7 or lose money out of their earnings in the experiment. Women exhibit more loss aversion than men; however, gender does not significantly influence wage or e↵ort choices.
The first result from examining the e↵ect of loss aversion is that loss averse employers are less likely to cut nominal wages in Recession. Figure 7 presents results for employers labeled Loss Averse and Loss Tolerant based on their choices in the loss aversion elicitation. A Loss Averse subjects is one who reject all lotteries or who only accepted one lottery. Among Loss Averse employers, there are as many employers who decided not to cut nominal wages after the shock in Recession as those who did cut wages. The pattern among Loss Tolerant employers appears di↵erent. Loss Tolerant employers are more likely to cut wages, which they might have thought was fair given the negative economic shock.
The apparent pattern in Figure 7 is not significant with a chi-square test for the full sample. However, if we apply our usual restriction of only looking at firms who are paired with a worker that was not already 6. CONCLUSION at the minimum e↵ort level in round 4, then the chi-squared test is significant at the 10% level. There is no similar e↵ect in Inf lation, which might be because employers can give a real wage cut without altering the nominal wage. The di↵erent behavior of loss averse employers suggests that they hold di↵erent beliefs about how workers react to wage cuts. There is suggestive evidence from the nonlinear model estimating from the previous section that loss averse employers in Recession have di↵erent beliefs that loss tolerant employers in Recession, but the di↵erence is not statistically significant. That would be a promising area for future study.
RESULTS
Loss
Also using a version of the model reported in Table 3 , we can test if workers who are more loss averse also react more strongly to wage cuts. It is not the case that workers who appear loss averse in the loss aversion elicitation react more strongly to wage cuts. We do not take this as evidence that loss aversion is unrelated to e↵ort provision. Abeler et al. [2011] found that loss aversion, as measured by similar lottery choices, predicted a subject's decision to stop working early at tedious tasks to avoid a loss.
Reference-dependent taxi drivers in New York stop working once they have achieved a daily income target (Crawford and Meng [2011] ), and in a field experiment, Fehr and Goette [2007] also find that loss aversion correlates with the decision of bicycle messengers to stop working early to avoid loss. Similarly Abeler et al. [2011] show that experimental subjects will stop working early at a real e↵ort task in order avoid a loss relative to an induced reference point. Subjects in the Abeler et al. study have a 50% chance of winning a fixed payment f and often complete just enough tasks so that 50% of the time they would also obtain f from their piece-rate earnings. Subjects considered loss averse (because they decline lotteries with a positive expected value to avoid possible losses) are more likely to stop working at the point that minimizes the potential for disappointment.
In our experiment, workers cannot explicitly avoid losses, so perhaps experiments in which people give up money to avoid losses cannot always be used to predict behavior when people are reacting to a loss that has been forced on them. We find that whether or not a worker is loss aversion by standard measures, they will punish a wage cut with a reduction in e↵ort.
Since wage cuts are rare in the economy and the output of individual workers is often unobservable, our experiment provides a unique opportunity to test the morale theory of wage rigidity. We find that workers reduce e↵ort in reaction to nominal wage cuts. Although this fall in morale is often used as an explanation for wage rigidity, half of the employers in our experiment cut wages. The reason, as least in part, is that firms have incorrect beliefs about how workers will react to wage cuts. We are the first to make an explicit link between beliefs and the behavior of employers.
Our experiment highlights the role of beliefs in economy-wide wage rigidity. We have not ruled out other reasons for wage rigidity, such as menu costs and peer comparison. However, we show that a manager with correct beliefs should probably avoid cutting wages, even in the absence of those forces, and in our environment managers who do not cut wages earn more money.
There is a growing literature indicating that labor supply is a↵ected by loss aversion. Workers in our experiment are reacting to a loss instead of avoiding a loss. Our results lead to questions for future research. Do the same people who would pay to avoid a loss also react the most strongly to losses they cannot avoid? We also present a good method for examining the e↵ects of inflation on decision making which can be used in future research.
Economists cannot precisely define the circumstances under which workers perceive nominal wage cuts as o↵ensive. Bracha et al. [2015] found that e↵ort provision is a↵ected by jealousy of a peer earning a higher wage. However, if a su cient justification is given for unequal pay, the di↵erence in e↵ort provision disappears. Friedman [1968] argued that the e↵ects of inflation diminish as people realized through experience what the real variables are. Negative reciprocity is contingent on the larger context of a decision (Cox and Deck [2005] ). In what context would employers accurately perceive the insult caused by a wage cut (see Kendall and Oprea [2018] on belief correction)? Future experiments could discover which contexts induce workers to act according to the predictions of our naïve employers.
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In conclusion, we present an experiment designed test behaviors that have important macroeconomic implications. Taylor [1980] proposed that price rigidity is partly due to staggered nominal contracts. It is costly to renegotiate a contract, so for an individual firm in any given period it is often rational to remain in a sub-optimal price contract. Calvo [1983] presents a highly tractable and widely-used model wherein only a certain fraction of firms are able to adjust prices in each period of time. Little work has been done that would allow economists to predict which firms adjust prices. Future research can establish how firms form their beliefs and how the feedback from the behavior of workers leads to wage rigidity among a large fraction of firms in most countries. Figure 6 indicates that e↵ort is significantly lower from workers who received a wage cut. It is important to establish the fact that e↵ort changed relative to what individual workers were doing in round 4, not that workers who were already at a low level of e↵ort were the ones to receive wage cuts.
The full sample of workers is shown in Figure A2 . Workers who received a wage cut decreased their e↵ort in percentage terms. It is misleading to make treatment comparisons without also taking the percentage In Figure A2 , the extreme upswing in e↵ort among workers who did not receive a nominal wage cut is driven by several workers who were at the minimum e↵ort level in round 4. Most of them remained at the minimum in round 5 (they cannot go down any further in response to a wage cut). However, some of those workers increased their e↵ort which produced a change of up to 1400%. (Moving from 0.5 to 1 is an increase of 100% while moving the other way from 1 to 0.5 is a decrease of 50%. )
The sample used in Figure 6 is preferable to convey what the cooperative subjects did in the experiment and how they responded to wage changes. Figure A3 pictures the average e↵ort changes among subjects who had the option of lowering their e↵ort level because they were above 0.05 in round 4. When workers at the minimum e↵ort level are removed, 95 observations of workers remain. The relevant economic question addressed in this paper is how to maintain good worker morale, which assumes that good morale exists before a negative economic shock. Figure A3 indicates that workers who experienced a wage cut reduced their e↵ort significantly, relative to their e↵ort level in round 4. This is the derivation of the utility maximizing e↵ort choice by a worker who reciprocates high e↵ort for high wages if ↵ > 0. Recall the utility function:
A.2 Analysis of Full Sample of Subjects
Obtain the first order condition by setting the derivative U/ e = 0.
Simply solve for e↵ort to obtain the best-response to the wage.
B.2 Optimal Wage for a Profit-Maximizing Employer
This is the derivation of the optimal nominal wage without loss aversion, assuming an interior solution. The real profit can be found by dividing the nominal profit by the price level.
First, we substitute e↵ort with the best response function of the worker.
We arrive at a first order condition by taking the derivative.
Rearranging, we simplify to R n = n 2 .
B.3 Derive Threshold level of Loss Aversion for Wage Rigidity to be Optimal Wage-Setting Strategy
The profit-maximizing condition is (R 1 n 0 )ê(n 0 , I ) > (R 1 n 1 )ê(n 1 , I ). The threshold value is a function of the specific parameters, so the first step is to insert the parameters we use in our experiment: R 0 = 1150; R 1 = 1035; ↵ = 0.3; = 0.2.
Next, we substitute the e↵ort response,ê(w 1 ,
The level of that satisfies this equality is the lowest level that could cause wage rigidity to be a profit-maximizing strategy on the part of strategic employers. By rearranging the equation and solving for I , we find this lower bound, > 0.002. The lower bound is small, thus it does not take a large degree of loss aversion for wage rigidity to result, in our stylized example. After the drop in R, the new n ⇤ falls as defined in the section above, but if is su ciently large, the more profitable strategy is for firms to remain at the previous wage level.
C Text of the Instructions
Welcome. You have the opportunity to earn cash at the end of this experiment based on the decisions made by you and others. At the end of the experiment and after a questionnaire, you will be paid the total amount you have earned in the experiment plus $5 for arriving on time today.
Out of several participants, half of you are randomly selected to be employers and half of you are employees. No one will know your identity or the actions you take during this experiment.
At any time during the instructions, raise your hand and the experimenter will answer questions. Please turn o↵ all electronic devices. Talking or communication is not allowed during the experiment.
To calculate how much money you can earn, you will use addition and multiplication. The first computer screen is to practice calculation and opening the calculator tool. Click Begin on the screen to start the math practice. Click on the calculator icon to open the calculator tool.
Add the following numbers together. 12.34 + 56
Multiply these two numbers. 45 x 9.01
Type your answers into the boxes on the screen. Click Submit Calculations to continue. This is a timeline for the experiment. There are 7 rounds. In every round, there are 3 steps. Some questions will be asked after Round 5 and after Round 7.
Step If you are an employee you will be matched with one of the employers for all rounds. Each repeated round will consist of the following steps, although some rounds do not include step 1.
Step 1:
An employer sets a salary that they will pay (this will not happen in Round 3, 4, 6, or 7). The salary number is in Experiment Currency Units (ECUs), the tickets that you earn during the experiment. The employer cannot set a wage that is so high that the employer will lose money or that is so low that the employee will lose money.
The employer sets a salary or wage in Round 1. They can change that wage or keep the same wage for Round 2. The wage will stay the same for rounds 2, 3 and 4. Employers may change the wage between Round 4 and Round 5, or they may keep the wage the same. The wage in Round 5, 6, and 7 will be the same.
Step 1: Set first wage level for Round 1 Stage 0 at wage 0 Round 1 Step 2: Set first e↵ort level
Step 3: Review payments Round 2 Set a wage for Rounds 2-4 Stage 1 at wage 1 Round 3
Round 4 Round 5 Questions Stage 2 at wage 2 Round 6
Round 7 Questionnaire
C. TEXT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
Step 2:
The employee observes the wage and chooses his or her e↵ort level. The possible e↵ort choices are shown in this table:
.05 0.1 .15 0.2 .25 0.3 .35 0.4 .45 0.5 .55 0.6 .65 0.7 .75 0.8 .85 0.9 .95 1 Participants review the results from the round. Results are displayed in Experiment Currency Units (ECUs) they earned during the round. ECUs will be exchanged for dollars in cash at the end according to an exchange rate.
How to Earn Money
An employee earns a wage from the employer. The employee pays the cost of the e↵ort level that he or she chooses. Practice reading the cost of e↵ort table (split into two tables).
E↵ort 0 Every e↵ort level has a cost paid by the worker. For example, the cost of the e↵ort level 0.5 is 28 cents or $0.28, located directly under 0.5 in the table. A worker has to pay 80 cents for an e↵ort level of 1.
Note that a worker earns a wage in ECUs and pays the cost of e↵ort in dollars. The workers payment for a round is the value of their ECU wage minus the cost of e↵ort they pay.
On the next computer practice screen, enter the e↵ort level that costs $0.24 Enter the e↵ort level that costs $0.57
Click the Submit E↵ort Answers button.
The amount that an employer earns in one round depends on the wage and the e↵ort of the employee they are matched with. This is how the employer is compensated: The employer subtracts the wage from 1150 and then multiplies that number by the e↵ort level of the employee.
In one round the employer earns (1150 wage) ⇥ ef f ort level
To do a practice calculation on the next practice screen, first type in a wage. Second, select an e↵ort level. Click the Submit E↵ort Level button.
Make your practice calculation by subtracting the wage you entered from 1150 (use the calculator if you need it). Then, multiply that number by the e↵ort level you selected.
If the answer you calculate has a number after the decimal point, round your answer. For example, 400.5 rounds up to 401 and 300.2 rounds down to 300.
Your choices cannot cause the example worker to lose money. If you make a choice that would lead to losing money, a pop up message will notify you. Note that e↵ort costs money.
Enter the profit and then click Submit Profit Calculation. When you enter the correct calculation, you can advance to the next practice screen. Please raise your hand if you have a question and the experimenter will help you.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for all 7 rounds. The exchange rate is 1 dollar for every 130 ECUs.
It is possible that there will be a one-time change in the exchange rate or other numbers for the profit calculation between Stage 1 and Stage 2. If that happens, you will be notified.
Do not talk to other participants during the experiment. If you have a question, ask the experimenter.
Review
During a round, employers set a wage and then employees set an e↵ort level. During the experiment, participants earn experimental currency units (ECU) that are exchanged for dollars at the end based on the exchange rate.
C. TEXT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
Some questions will be asked after round 5 and after round 7. The next screen informs you of your role in the experiment. Click OK. Next, you will begin Round 1 and employers will set the first wage. Any further instruction you will need will be on the computer screen. Keep this instruction sheet at your desk for reference.
